December 1903 that a close eye shouldbe kept on developments between D’Arcy and a possible French source of funding? It is highly unlikely that Pretyman would have written such a letter to D’Arcy completely out of the blue, particularly bearing in mind that there does not appear to have been any contact between them since the rejection of D’Arcy’s approach to the Admiralty the previous November. It is therefore probable that some reconnaissance work took place prior to Pretyman’s approach. The impression given by Pretyman in his letter to Sir Charles Greenway is significant, in that it states, ‘we further ascertained that Mr D’Arcy was, at that moment, in the Riviera negotiating for the transfer of his concession to the French Rothschilds’. This very much suggests that such information had come to them literally at a moment’s notice, necessitating prompt action.
D’Arcy was staying at the Grand Hotel while the Rothschild negotiations were taking place, and there would seem little point in the kind of approach featured in Reilly’s story. Where better to approach D’Arcy than at his own hotel, and who better to do so than a fellow guest?
Le Littoral very helpfully lists comings and goings during the period that Alphonse de Rothschild and William Knox D’Arcy were in Cannes. Of the many British visitors passing through, one particular couple stand out – Mr and Mrs William Melville, who stayed at the Grand Hotel throughout D’Arcy’s stay there. 44
Melville was no stranger to France, 45 and was a fluent French speaker. 46 Whatever transpired during the Melville’s ‘holiday’ in Cannes, D’Arcy was soon in receipt of Pretyman’s letter and on his way back to London to meet with the Admiralty’s Oil Committee, who approached Burmah Oil to undertake the formation of a British syndicate.
This process was not, however, quite as speedy and seamless as Pretyman implied fifteen years after the event. In fact, negotiations between D’Arcy and the Burmah Group did not begin for another six months. In the intervening period D’Arcy was experiencing more difficulties with Lloyds Bank, who were pressing him toput forward the concession itself as security against his overdraft, something D’Arcy fiercely resisted. As a result, D’Arcy once again turned to Alphonse de Rothschild, although this time he did not negotiate directly, but sent John Fletcher Moulton to Cannes as his representative. 47 Melville, by virtue of the fact that he was now a known quantity so far as Fletcher Moulton was concerned, perhaps felt that his presence could compromise the situation, and appears at this point to have enlisted Reilly’s assistance.
Back in February, the threat that the oil concession might slip into foreign hands had been successfully averted. Now, three short months later, the possibility was again in contention, and it was deemed essential from the Admiralty’s point of view that the renewed talks be stopped dead in their tracks. Unable to again play the same hand that had worked so well before, namely to appeal to D’Arcy’s patriotism, other means of stalling the negotiations had now to be found.
One of the surest ways of scuttling the discussions would have been to sow seeds of doubt in de Rothschild’s mind concerning the chances of oil being found in the location D’Arcy was drilling. By the time the talks commenced in June, Fletcher Moulton was already complaining that de Rothschild’s terms were now somewhat less favourable than when they had last met. 48 His despondence was even more evident when, on 24 June, he cryptically referred to an ‘unhelpful outside interest’ whose influence had led to de Rothschild questioning the location of drilling. 49 Although the ‘unhelpful outside interest’ is never actually identified by Fletcher Moulton, it seems clear that there is a distinct connection between this involvement and de Rothschild’s acquisition of a report that seems to have been the