entrepreneurship, courage, a higher purpose,
learning agility, and people skills or emotional intelligence. Assessing candidates
for these qualities and developing them in the pipeline of rising leaders is vital.
4
The India Strategy and Operating Model
The trick in globalizing is to strike the delicate balance between being mindlessly
global and helplessly local.
—ASHOK GANGULY, FORMER CHAIRMAN, HINDUSTAN UNILEVER
October 2010. John Flannery, president of GE India, had a big smile on his face as
he left a celebration in Delhi at which CEO Jeff Immelt had congratulated GE’s India
team for winning a $750 million gas turbine deal—India’s largest order for turbines—from
Reliance Power. The main reason GE India had won against tough German and cheaper
Chinese competitors was speed: the company took sixty days from bid to close. Reliance
Power had been amazed; a year earlier, it would have taken GE India anywhere from
nine to twelve months to put together such a complex deal. Each unit would have negotiated
separately with the customer and lawyers would have taken months to wordsmith each
clause.
This time around, the GE India team, operating under the “One GE” model that Immelt
had unveiled a year earlier, had been empowered to close the commercial transaction
from end to end, which included arranging for financing. Determined to prove the operating
model’s power to Reliance and to GE’s headquarters, the GE India team worked 24/7
to win the contract with the full backing of the global GE network that provided technical
expertise and supply chain capability. It marked the vindication of GE’s new strategy
and operating model for India, and signaled a reversal of fortunes for a company whose
revenues had declined from $2.1 billion in 2008 to $1.6 billion in 2009.
Consider an example from another industry. By 2008, telecom giant Nokia dominated
the Indian mobile handset market, with a share of nearly 70 percent. India had become
Nokia’s second-largest market after China. The company had executed a textbook-perfect
strategy, making an early commitment to India, developing a wide range of models at
different price points, investing in manufacturing and distribution reach, and building
a respected brand. Then, a few unknown Indian companies like Micromax, Spice, Zen,
and Karbonn started offering an unusual product. Using low-cost chipsets from a Chinese
company called Mediatek, their innovation was a handset that could take two SIM cards.
Customers liked these phones because they could take advantage of concessional offers
from Indian telecom operators, which were then waging an all-out tariff war. One SIM
card (and telephone number) stayed constant, allowing friends and family to call.
Customers would swap out the second SIM card every month to take advantage of the
best deal for outgoing calls. Despite frantic pleas by Nokia India for such phones,
it wasn’t until June 2011 that Nokia Finland finally responded by developing the dual
SIM phones, C1 and C2. The consequences were catastrophic: by then, Nokia’s market
share had plunged to under 30 percent, while the upstarts captured almost 30 percent
of the market. 1
Why did Nokia in Finland not respond decisively to what its local team so clearly
saw? How did GE change and allow its Indian operation to move quickly? The answer
to both questions lies in what I call the India operating model.
Until now, multinational companies have done well in countries that resemble their
home markets. They don’t do as well in countries like India that are economically
and culturally very different. Except for a few industries like commercial aircraft
and armaments, a one-size-fits-all approach guarantees irrelevance in emerging markets.
However, standardization is critical to success in a multinational company that plans
to operate in many countries. Limiting product proliferation drives