Destroy Carthage by Alan Lloyd Page B

four were stoned to death by impassioned compatriots.
    Religious attitudes. Hannibal's claim at Selinus that his victory indicated the abandonment of the city by its gods was unexceptional logic in antiquity, certainly among ancient generals. Divine commitment to martial causes was vital to participants, who watched for signs of holy displeasure with fearful eyes. At Acragas, a cemetery outside the city was used to provide material for the siege until one of the tombs was struck by lightning. Immediately, Himilco stopped the desecra­tion and offered a sacrifice to the gods.
    When disease among the troops intensified, it was actually deemed provident to build a temple in Carthage to honour Demeter and Persephone, Greek deities much favoured in Sicily and thought likely to have had a hand in the pestilence.
    The fall of Acragas, finally abandoned by its citizens in December 406, brought a more tangible aspect of Greek cre­ativity to Carthage. Before the vast amount of booty was shared within Himilco's army, the most valuable works, of art were set aside for Africa, to be greatly admired by the Carthag­inians. The new year promised even better prizes. To the east of Acragas lay Gela, poorly fortified, then Himilco's real ob­jective, Syracuse.
     
12: Dionysius
     
     
    The fall of Acragas, producing furore at Syracuse, tossed power to a remarkable demagogue named Dionysius. He had begun his career as a clerk in a public office; he was to rule Syracuse for thirty-eight years, becoming not only the most powerful of Siceliots but a force in Greek Italy, indeed throughout the Greek world.
    A former adherent of Hermocrates, Dionysius had distin­guished himself in subordinate rank during the attempt to save Acragas, a campaign which brought recrimination on the Syracusan generals and enabled him to make his move. It was a classic bid for tyrannical authority, based on popular anxieties, exploitation of class resentment and the ruthless sacrifice of colleagues.
    Simultaneously boasting humble roots and seeking rich sup­port, Dionysius assured his election to the board of generals by fervent speeches against the discredited commanders. Then, encouraging fear of Carthaginian invasion, he accused his fel­lows on the new board of negligence, calling for an overall commander. Invested with supreme powers as a crisis measure, Dionysius never looked back.
    At first, his position was precarious. Himilco had advanced on Gela at the end of the winter; only prompt reinforcement could save the town. Dionysius marched with a hastily as­sembled army of some 30,000 troops, including Italiots (Italian Greeks) and non-Syracusan Siceliots, accompanied along the coast by a protective fleet.
    Ambitiously, he planned to attack Himilco's position west of Gela in a multiple operation, part amphibious, part by land. The synchronization of assaults proved too difficult for unsophisticated units which, approaching the foe in succession, were defeated in detail. Dionysius, in Gela when he learned that his tactics had misfired, withdrew toward Syracuse amid a stream of Gelan refugees.
    Only the loyalty of his professional guards now spared him the fate that had served the generals after Acragas. Aristocratic units of his cavalry, reaching Syracuse before him, took con­trol and denounced his dictatorship. But they underestimated his determination. Fighting his way into the city, Dionysius overpowered the dissidents. By conceding terms favourable to Carthage, he obtained Himilco's recognition of his govern­ment.
    The Carthaginian returned to Africa in triumph. Apart from the original dominion in western Sicily, Carthage had gained Segesta, Selinus, Acragas, Gela, the remains of Himera and other places, as dependencies, securing the separation from Syracuse of every other state on the island. Never had her Sicilian empire been greater, her treasury richer in booty. Never had a western power imposed itself with such authority on Greek affairs.
    But the price