Hitler's Lost Spy by Greg Clancy Page A

Chapter 8) Annette had demonstrated her overlapping camera ability and the film would have found its way, indirectly, to her contact.
    Invisible ink was an old method of conveying secret information, and several varieties were available. By the commencement of World War II, tests to detect invisible ink were well advanced and postal authorities could use these on intercepted mail. This would have been a gamble for Annette, and possibly too slow.
    What means did Annette use to convey whatever information she needed to pass on? She may have planned to carry out physical deliveries or arranged collections by others. We do not know, except that such exchanges may have been intended for clandestine meetings. But amazingly, she had managed to find employment in the public radio industry which at that time would have been a foreign spy’s ultimate centre of operations for the successful transmission of coded information.
    A radio announcer reading from a script prepared by others (e.g. a newsreader) has little, if any, opportunity to use the airwaves for anything but delivering the script.  But ‘discretional’ broadcasting – that which allows the presenter to perform with a capacity to cunningly deviate from the script – is very different. Passing coded information through the airwaves is far easier and safer than a physical delivery, or via a telephone line at risk of being tapped. Annette had achieved the almost unthinkable – security in her employment, selective friendships, and the ideal avenue for the dissemination of coded messages. Her contacts would need to do no more than sit at home and turn on the radio.
    It is difficult not to be engrossed by the intrigues, conduct and mystique of Annette, both as woman and spy. Her demeanour, personal associations and achievements in broadcasting all present an image of a lady whose interests were poles apart from the shadowy world of espionage. Her conduct, from a security perspective, was almost faultless – well beyond the normal zones of suspicion.
    Nonetheless, a near flawless security assessment is not an indemnity against errors of judgement. In October 1938, seven months after her arrival in Australia, and a few months before the commencement of her fashion program on radio 2GB, Annette made a critical mistake.  One oversight, one stumble out of her carefully designed camouflage, but one so vital it would relentlessly shadow her to the gangplank of the ship on which she departed Australia in February 1940.
    FOOTNOTES
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    7  ‘Navy’ referred to Naval Intelligence. The Director of Naval Intelligence, Commander Rupert Long established a comprehensive system of informants during the late 1930’s, from which sources information on Annette Wagner crossed paths with that derived by Military Intelligence.

6

Annette’s Jigsaw – Some Ill-fitting Pieces
    Annette Wagner entered Australia with a first-rate presentation and unsuspecting testimonials. But her initial success in avoiding suspicion did not eliminate an inherent problem in her future spying role – that of preserving the smokescreen around her activities as they broadened across an unfamiliar social landscape. As in any other form of business, an unbridled success in espionage activities may create its own problems. A spy needs to be committed to preserving the status quo. The possible downside is that the more convincing the performance, and the more successful the daily processes of deception, the greater the likelihood is that these new successes will cross boundaries and possibly attract unwelcome attention from new entrants into a spy’s additional region of influence.
    In effect, the more ‘permanent integration’ success a foreign spy enjoys, the greater the vigilance required to ensure that these perceptions are protected. Strange behaviour from otherwise ‘normal’ people swiftly produces rumour and speculation.
    Annette had