Louis: The French Prince Who Invaded England by Catherine Hanley Page A

before he could march to join his allies in the north? Each course of action had its own particular disadvantages. Pitched battles were a rarity in the Middle Ages (the Capetians had not fought one since Philip’s grandfather Louis VI engaged Henry I of England at Brémule in 1119, and even William the Conqueror fought only two in his lifetime) as they were a huge gamble – a commander risked everything on one throw of the dice, and external influences such as weather or luck could sway the outcome one way or the other. Warfare was therefore characterised more by ravaging and sieges than by battles. If Louis were to engage John he could risk his entire army, not to mention his own life. But if he did nothing John might subdue La-Roche-aux-Moines and then move on to the next castle, and before long find himself master of many of the major strongholds. His position would then be strengthened beyond challenge.
    Louis was a warrior at heart so his decision, supported by Henry Clément, was to attack John’s forces. He gave the order to advance and set off, ‘as ardent as lightning’, according to William the Breton, ‘riding at the front of his cavalry squadrons, with every hour which delayed the onset of combat seeming long’.
    At La-Roche-aux-Moines John heard that Louis’s force was advancing towards him, and at first he welcomed the idea of a battle as he had a vastly superior number of men at his disposal (William the Breton puts it at triple the number Louis had with him). However, many of John’s men were mercenaries, fighting for money and less willing to risk their lives in battle than they were to besiege a castle, and many of the others were Poitevin nobles who had defected to John’s cause. Siding with the English might have seemed a good idea while the French monarchy was miles away, but when it came to a choice of actually taking up arms against the heir to the throne, the risks seemed too high and they wavered.
    Unsure of how much of his army he could now rely on, and wary of being caught between the arriving force and a potential attack from the castle garrison sallying forth, John dropped the siege and fled, departing with such speed that he left behind his camp, most of his baggage, his siege machinery and many of his men. Roger of Wendover says that John ‘retired in great annoyance from the siege’, while William the Breton says he ‘was vanquished by fear and thought of nothing but flight’; whatever the exact truth, John escaped, making such good time that he turned up some 70 miles (110 km) away only two days later, but much of his army had not yet crossed the river when Louis’s host arrived. Many of John’s men were killed, drowned or captured, and Louis seized much booty from the camp, collecting the armour, weapons and goods which had been abandoned.
    Although there had been no battle as such, Louis’s decisive action had annihilated the southern threat, meaning that Philip could deal with their enemies in the north without worrying about John’s army suddenly appearing behind him. He too was persuaded that a pitched battle would settle the outcome, and he faced up to his enemies on 27 July 1214 at Bouvines, a village a few miles south-east of Lille. Among others he had with him Odo III, duke of Burgundy; Walter III de Châtillon, count of St Pol; Robert II, count of Dreux, and his brother Philip de Dreux, bishop of Beauvais; and Guérin, bishop of Senlis. Ranged against him were Otto, Renaud, Ferrand and William, the earl of Salisbury. The allies were confident – the Minstrel of Reims has them deciding even before the battle which bits of France they will award themselves after their victory – but despite a scare when he was unhorsed in the battle, the day belonged entirely to Philip. The battle was both bloody and claustrophobic, as some excerpts from the Philippide , William the Breton’s eyewitness account, show:
The combatants are engaging each other over the whole plain in