Northmen: The Viking Saga AD 793-1241 by John Haywood Page A

land. Viking longships had only a shallow draught so a raiding fleet could make a landing almost anywhere on the open coast or penetrate far inland on rivers. If they found local forces alert and waiting, the Vikings could just move on and try somewhere else, and sooner or later they would catch somebody off guard. When that happened, the Vikings could plunder and be well away before sufficient local forces could gather to oppose them. By collecting their forces to oppose the Vikings in one place, the defenders necessarily left other areas exposed to attack. This tended to undermine the defence. In most western European kingdoms, the Scandinavian kingdoms included, adult free men had to perform levy service when called out by their lords or kings. Men willingly turned out when a campaign involved invading a neighbouring state because of the opportunities for plunder that it brought: the Vikings were not at all unique in early medieval Europe in seeing war as an opportunity to profit. In contrast, defensive campaigns brought no such benefits to offset the risks and costs of war, and men were also naturally reluctant to leave their own families and farms unprotected. As a result, the call to arms often went unanswered.
    Full-scale battles were relatively rare in the Viking Age. Thanks to their mobility, Vikings could generally avoid fighting if they thought the odds were unfavourable to them. However, the pay-off from victory could be very high so Vikings were not shy about fighting when it suited them. Plundering could most efficiently be done by splitting an army up into smaller bands to rove widely over the countryside. However, such bands were always vulnerable to being picked off by local forces. If the defender’s army could be engaged and decisively defeated first, the Vikings were free to plunder unhindered. Apart from loot, and a strong hand when it came to negotiating tribute payments with the vanquished, victory in battle also enhanced a Viking leader’s reputation, securing the loyalty of his warriors and attracting new ones. Conversely, the defenders were acutely aware of the awful consequences of defeat. Just maintaining an army in the field at least inhibited Viking activity, so the defenders were usually more cautious about seeking battle than the Anglo-Saxons. This may seem a cowardly strategy, but they had a lot more to lose than the Vikings so it was often safer to pursue a policy of damage limitation than to risk everything on a battle.
    The ‘great heathen army’
    In 865 it was finally England’s turn to feel the full fury of Viking attack. Early in the year, a Viking fleet once again settled on Thanet. The long-suffering people of Kent had had enough of being raided by now and instead of resistance they offered the Vikings tribute in return for peace. This was the first time that what came much later to be called Danegeld was offered by the Anglo-Saxons. The offer of tribute was a sign that in the worst affected areas morale was beginning to break, but the money was never actually paid. The Vikings were merely using negotiations to lull the people of Kent into a false sense of security before launching a surprise attack on them. The Vikings had calculated that they could get more by plundering than from negotiating. Far more serious, the same year saw the arrival in East Anglia of a ‘great heathen army’ from Denmark. So far the Vikings had only been after plunder. This army was different, its objective was to conquer and settle.
    The leaders of the Danish army were an alliance of landless ‘sea kings’, the most prominent of whom were Ivar, Halfdan and Ubba. Ivar and Halfdan were certainly brothers: Ubba may have been their brother but the evidence is inconclusive. Contemporary sources have nothing to say about any of the leaders’ origins, but in Danish and Icelandic sources of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries Ivar had become identified with the enigmatically named Ivar the Boneless, a