Reasons of State by Alejo Carpentier Page B

enemy—and he directed the light of his lantern onto a map spread on the undulant surfaceof bats’ guano covering the ground—had steadily retreated towards the Rio Verde, without ever taking the initiative. Today, on the other hand, we had met them in a pitched battle, such as had not been seen since the Wars of Independence. Of course, thorough preparations had been necessary. The enemy had got too much help from the partisans, mounts, cattle, sacks of maize, information passed from village to village with incredible speed by these filthy mountaineers, always sympathetic with rioters and pronunciamentos. It was not a modern battle. Half a century ago these Andeans had come, driving us all crazy with their marches on the capital and their caudillos, and (on arriving at the Presidential Palace) had been amazed to find kitchens worked by gas, sanitation, taps running hot water, and telephones from room to room. This was why it had been necessary to carry out a huge “mopping-up” operation before the battle: burning of houses and villages, summary execution of all suspects, shooting at random into groups of dancers, birthday or baptism parties, which were merely pretexts for whispered propaganda, passing on of information and revolutionary plotting—not to mention certain wakes when, strange to say, there was no corpse in the coffin.
    “But in Santo Tomás del Ancón you had no choice,” said the Head of State. Sad, very sad, of course, but one couldn’t make war with kid gloves on. You had always to follow Von Moltke’s two incontrovertible principles: “The best thing that can happen in a war is a quick ending … But to end it quickly all means are good, not excepting the most iniquitous.” A text of basic importance published by the German General Staff in 1902 stated: “If a war is waged energetically it cannot be directed solely against the combatant enemy; it must also aim at destroying his material and moral resources. Humanitarian considerations can be taken into account only if they do notaffect the result of the war itself.” Besides which, Von Schlieffen had said …
    “Stop buggering about with your German classics,” said the Head of State. Von Schlieffen wanted battles to be fought on the chessboards of maps, from a distance, with communications by telephone, cars and motorcycles. But in this damned country without proper roads, and with so many forests, swamps, and mountain ranges, communications had to be maintained on the back of a mule or donkey—even horses were no use in some densely wooded mountains—or by messengers who could run till they dropped like the Indians of Atahualpa. Those theoretical battles fought by telescopes and field glasses, with squared maps and precision instruments, made one think at once of certain generals with moustaches like the Kaiser and a bottle of cognac within reach, not at all disposed—although there were a few exceptions—to rely on shooting and hanging. Our battles, on the other hand, had to be fought with our guts—like today’s—forgetting all the theories taught in military academies. And here the old gunners with their “three hands higher and two to the right, and a finger and a half of rectification,” who could wedge a gun with a millstone, were much more use than these raw lieutenants, stuffed with algebraic and ballistic gibberish that their subordinates didn’t understand, and who had to make calculations in an exercise book before letting off a shell, which in the end generally missed the target on one side or another. “In Latin America,” went on the Head of State, “in spite of artillery, machine guns, and all modern ironmongery bought from the Yankees, nature makes us go on fighting as in the times of the Punic Wars. If we had elephants, we’d make them cross the Andes.”
    “All the same, Von Schlieffen …”
    “Your Von Schlieffen based his entire strategy of war onthe battle of Cannae, won by Hannibal.” And the