Seconds to Disaster: US Edition by Ray Ronan Page A

cockpit.
    Faced with such an onslaught
of failures, the captain, Richard De Crespigny, decided to identify what
systems he and his crew still had operational and how to safeguard and use
these systems. This onslaught of failures is in essence what is becoming known
in the aviation industry as a “Black Swan” event: an incident that is entirely
unforeseeable. In this case, due to the severe nature of the damage caused when
the engine exploded.
    Much of the automation was
sidelined in this case by the pilots in a successful attempt at simplifying the
situation. It was a decision that likely saved the lives of the passengers and
crew on board.

The destroyed engine on QF32
    On March 1st 2008, Lufthansa
flight 44 from Munich to Hamburg attempted to land in strong winds of up to 47
knots. The left main wheel touched down and so the computers switched from “flight
mode” to “ground mode”. However, the aircraft was not yet firmly placed on the
runway, and the crew lost the control they needed due to the computer law
changeover designed into the Airbus 320 they were flying. Despite 60 tons of
plane and all its momentum, they were now at the mercy of the wind that swept
the aircraft towards the runway edge, and as a result the wingtip of the A320 struck
the tarmac.
    The flying pilot slammed
forward the throttles to abort the landing and made a go around; this decision
by the pilots saved the day. Within seconds of this action the computers
understood the pilots wanted to get airborne once more and so handed back full
control.
    132 passengers and 5 crew
escaped disaster that day. Investigators found the wind limits laid down by the
manufacturer and the operator were not only confusing, but there were varying
interpretations by pilots and the airlines about what you can actually do with
that model of aircraft. Also the control laws created a “glitch”, a moment when
the onboard automation didn’t recognize the situation.
    “No handbook tells you the
plane will do this,” a senior Lufthansa pilot told Der Spiegel. [58] Another Black Swan event?
    The problem, it appears, is
not that the automation is too powerful, but not powerful enough. It is not
truly “aware”, according to Donald Norman, and in the human sense cannot
self-monitor; therefore it cannot always give the pilots the total feedback
they need to alert them to a potential problem. Such feedback is essential if
equipment does fail and unexpected events—Black Swan events—occur.
    In the words of David
Learmount, of Flight Global: “There has been a loss of pilot exposure to
anything other than pre-packaged flight planning, followed by automated flight.”
He believes the atrophying of their skills must be reversed: “Airlines must
rebuild the pilot skills that automation takes away from them.”
    Leaning heavily on automation
to save the day, the airline industry strives to shorten the pilot training
route, to lengthen flight duty hours and increase work schedules. This is
raising a lot of concerns among seasoned professionals; one such result could
be a generation of pilots with low experience and a dependency on automation.
    “Automation reduced the
workload, the pressures in the cockpit and helped reduce accidents. That
pressure is reappearing with the arrival of the low fares frenzy. But the
carpet is fraying at the edges and is about to unravel,” says a seasoned captain,
who has over ten thousand hours with an airline headed towards a new low
fares philosophy. He worries that dependency on automation is seeding
complacency.
    Much of the training and
simulator testing done today was intended for older aircraft and hasn’t kept
pace with high tech design let alone automation.
    Crew training has to change to
take into account the psychology of pilots on the flight deck. The industry and
regulators need to get serious. A complete review of cockpit automation and
training for pilots is called for in order to prepare them for when their
onboard