Supreme Commander by Stephen E. Ambrose Page B

things, and was not going to waste any time. Marshall wanted to know who could do the job for him and who could not, and he wanted to know it immediately. Eisenhower’s answer would tell him whether this young general was up to the challenge. 3
    Eisenhower left Marshall’s office and went to a desk that had been assigned to him in the War Plans Division. In preparing his answer he had little to work with, for the United States had no specific plan for the war then going on in the Pacific. The official strategy was embodied inRAINBOW 5, a world-wide program which called for a major effort against the European Axis powers and a defensive effort in the Pacific. Marshall was determined to stick with RAINBOW 5, despite already mounting pressure to turn the full fury of American might, such as it was in December 1941, against the Japanese. The trouble was that RAINBOW 5 contained no settled solution for the defeat of Japan and was based on assumptions that were already crumbling in the face of the Japanese onslaught.
    The general idea had been that the Philippines would hold out long enough to allow the fleet to advance across the central Pacific through the Marshalls and the Carolines to save the islands, while the British, Dutch, and Chinese forces contained the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific. But already, a week after the conflict began, the plans were out of date. Except for its carriers, the United States had no fleet. It was apparent that the Philippines would not be able to hold out, nor would the colonial powers south of the Philippines. Willy-nilly the Americans were on the defense in the Pacific; the problem was whether to abandon the garrison in the Philippines, since any material sent there would inevitably wind up in Japanese hands, and build a base to the south, or to make an effort to hold the islands, or to try a combination of both. In addition, agreements had to be reached with the other governments fighting the Japanese.
    Eisenhower decided that, for morale purposes, the Philippines could not be abandoned. The War Department would have to make every effort to reinforce the garrison. Sticking a sheet of yellow tissue paper in his typewriter, he tapped out with one finger “Steps to Be Taken.” The first requirement was to “build up in Australia a base of operations from which supplies and personnel (air and ground types) can be moved into the Philippines. Speed is essential.” This program would not only give heart to the American people and the soldiers in the Philippines but would provide the beginnings of a long-range counteroffensive. Australia appeared fairly safe; with its good harbors, British Commonwealth connections, and English-speaking people, it was the obvious place to build up the base of operations for the Pacific war.
    Eisenhower’s next paragraph was a simple sentence: “Influence Russia to enter the war.” There were great potential benefits. Russian entry would tie down Japanese troops in Manchuria and provide the United States with airfields from which American bombers could hit the home islands of Japan.
    For immediate action, Eisenhower recommended sending a carrierwith Army pursuit planes, pilots, ammunition, and bombs from San Diego to Australia, and—if possible—saving time by sending a carrier directly from Hawaii to Australia. Another recommendation was to move planes and crews to Australia from the West Coast by the fastest available commercial vessels. Finally, Eisenhower wanted to ferry the planes collected in Australia to the Philippines. 4
    Eisenhower took his written recommendation to Marshall, handed it to him, and said it would be a long time before major reinforcements could go to the Philippines, longer than the garrison could hold out, but the United States had to do everything possible, because “The people of China, of the Philippines, of the Dutch East Indies will be watching us. They may excuse failure but they will not excuse abandonment.…” The base