foliage and smoke, even signaling was problematic. Chickamauga has been justifiably described as âa hidden battle,â directed not by army commanders but by field commanders. It became essentially a battle of brigades and regimentsâa soldierâs fight, waged with rare ferocity.
While Rosecrans and his commanders braced for powerful follow-up attacks on the Union left, Braggâs army instead began probing the Union line from its left to its right, seeking weak spots to exploit. The artillery sounded like âthe thunder, as of a thousand anvils,â wrote Colonel John Beatty. Braggâs forces found no chinks in Thomasâs lines where, by midday, roughly 40,000 of Rosecransâs 58,000 troops were concentrated, leaving the Union center and right thinly manned.
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OPPOSITE THE POINT AT which Crittendenâs and McCookâs corps were joined, and near Sheridanâs division, Hood and his commander, Lieutenant General James Longstreet, massed the five divisions of the Army of Northern Virginiaâs I Corps. The Rebels faced, at most, three scattered Union divisions. Longstreetâs men waited for the right moment to strike.
With growing concern, Sheridan watched the steady migration of McCookâs and Crittendenâs brigades to Thomasâs left wing. He recognized that âwe were in bad straitsâ and that Thomas had to be reinforced. But Sheridan questioned the wisdom of shifting troops in the face of a numerically superior enemy. 5
McCook had just ordered two of Sheridanâs three brigadesâthose commanded by Brigadier General William H. Lytle and the wounded Colonel Bradleyâs successor, Colonel Nathan Walworthâto join Thomas when Longstreet attacked, his divisions arrayed in a single column to deliver a âclenched-fist blow.â 6
McCook called it âa most furious and impetuous assault in overwhelming numbers.â The 16,000 Rebels crashed through a large gap that suddenly yawned in the Union right-center where Brigadier General Thomas Wood had just withdrawn his division to send to Thomas.
With pitch-perfect timing, Longstreetâs five attacking divisions struck before the hole left by Woodâs division could be filled and just as other units, including Sheridanâs two brigades, were shifting to the left. Just thirty minutes earlier or later, and the Rebels might have met better-organized defenders.
Assistant War Secretary Charles Dana, a former journalist assigned to observe Rosecransâs armyâsome said to spy for War Secretary Edwin Stanton, who despised Rosecransâhad fallen asleep on the grass at Rosecransâs headquarters at the Widow Glennâs cabin behind Woodâs division when âthe most infernal noise I ever heardâ awakened him. Upon sitting up, he observed Rosecrans making the sign of the cross. This alarmed Dana, although Rosecrans, described as âa Jesuit of the highest style of Roman piety,â was merely exhibiting his devout Catholicism. Dana, however, concluded, âIf the general is crossing himself, we are in a desperate situation.â
He then saw for himself that they were indeed in deep trouble. A dense column of gray-clad troops, their bayonets glittering in the hazy sunlight, was quick-stepping toward them. The Rebel column stretched far to the southwest. Woodâs division was nowhere to be seen.
Rosecrans and his staff hastily evacuated the cabin when musket balls and shells began to rain down. They rode to higher ground along the eastern flank of Missionary Ridge and halted. There, Rosecrans, who must have felt like he was reliving the first hours of Stones River, watched his right wing break apart. He sent for Sheridan, but Sheridan could not come; âaffairs were too criticalâ for him to leave his command. 7
Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davisâs division and, behind it, Sheridanâs third brigade, commanded by Colonel Bernard Laiboldt,