Three Cups of Deceit: How Greg Mortenson, Humanitarian Hero, Lost His Way by Jon Krakauer Page A

the Wakhan Corridor. According to Mortenson, he and Abdul Rashid Khan drew up a formal contract over dinner that stated, in part:
 
The Kirghiz people, under the leadership of Abdul Rashid Khan, hereby sign this agreement to build a four-room school at Bozai Gumbaz, Wakhan, with the assistance of the registered charity NGO Central Asia Institute. 9
Central Asia Institute will provide building materials, skilled labor, school supplies, and help with teachers ’ salary and training.
     
    Seventeen months after this contract was allegedly signed, when Callahan stayed at Karajelga as Abdul Rashid Khan ’ s guest, he spoke at length with him. When Callahan told the sixty-nine-year-old Kyrgyz leader that an American charity called the Central Asia Institute intended to build a school for the Kyrgyz in the Pamir, Abdul Rashid Khan didn ’ t seem to know who Greg Mortenson was, or have any memory of ever meeting him, says Callahan. “ Eventually he pulled out a bunch of business cards, including Greg ’ s, but that might have been the only time Greg ever came up … . I think at some point we all come to look the same to them. ”
    To Abdul Rashid, Mortenson was just another Western do-gooder promising alms. The Kyrgyz leader wasn ’ t inclined to reject such an offer from Mortenson or anyone else — although, says Callahan, he would have preferred that CAI build a road to connect the Kyrgyz to the rest of Afghanistan: “ That ’ s what they wanted more than anything else in the world — a road. Second, they wanted some kind of health clinic. Third, as kind of an afterthought, they wanted a school. ” Their rationale for ranking clinics above schools, Callahan explains, was the appalling infant mortality rate in the Pamir. As one Kyrgyz elder told him, “ If 50 percent of the children die before age five, who is there to educate? ”
    At the time he interviewed Abdul Rashid Khan, Callahan had already visited other Kyrgyz camps to gather information about what kind of school CAI should build, and where. Both Abdul Rashid and his main competitor for influence in the Pamir — an arbob , or chieftain, named Haji Osman — were in favor of a boarding school, but nobody wanted to donate a piece of land on which to construct it. “ Everybody said that it should be built on someone else ’ s land, ” says Callahan, “ because if it was in one of their own camps, they would have to provide fuel to heat it, and food for the students, and all this other stuff. It sounded like a hassle to them, with little return. ”
    Upon arriving back in Kyrgyzstan to complete his fellowship, Callahan submitted a twenty-one-page report to Mortenson suggesting two sites that seemed appropriate for a CAI school: Bozai Gumbaz and a place called Chelap, nine miles up the valley from Bozai. As for the type of school that should be built, Callahan observed that the nomadic, widely scattered Kyrgyz population argued “ in favor of a boarding school, one with a dormitory (plus kitchen) attached to the main body of the school. ” In the report ’ s conclusion, however, Callahan warned, “ CAI will not only face the problem of constructing the schools but running them as well … . It is not at all clear where qualified, motivated teachers could be drawn, but it is certain that they would have to come from outside the Afghan Pamirs. ” Establishing a successful school that the Kyrgyz would actually use, he continued,
 
will almost certainly involve challenges unknown in CAI ’ s prior experience … . If CAI hopes to build more than just the nicest stable in the Pamirs, it will need to continually monitor the schools in order to make sure they are supplied, staffed, and run properly … . For these reasons, CAI should carefully consider its commitment to this project, in terms of time and resources, before any further steps are taken.
     
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    WHEN CALLAHAN delivered his report in October 2006, it brought his formal association with CAI