Twelve Desperate Miles by Tim Brady Page B

smokestack, the banana boat was now just another gray military ship hauling troops overseas. The
Contessa
had been turned from a pleasant cruise ship into a functional military transport.
    She sailed singly from pier 1 to Halifax, Nova Scotia, to join convoy HX 201. From Halifax she would sail in this, her first convoy, across the Atlantic to Belfast, where she would deposit her load of troops. Then it was on to Swansea in Wales, not far from Captain William John’s hometown, Cardiff, where the remainder of her cargo would be unloaded.
    There was a one-day stop in Boston for a convoy conference en route to Halifax, where orders were given by the commodore on how the voyage would proceed, including orders detailing signal instructions, setting a convoy speed, and creating an order and stations for the ships.HX 201 was composed of thirty-three vessels, primarily of American and British registry but with a handful of Dutch and Norwegian ships in the mix. The
Contessa
was the only ship of Honduran registry. The convoy sailed in a rectangular pattern, four ships north to south and nine ships east to west. Four destroyers were to escort the convoy at all times during the crossing. They cruised, roughly speaking, on the four corners of the ships’ formation.
    On August 2, the commodore’s vessel, the
Manchester Port
, left the Halifax harbor and was followed in a succession spaced a few minutesapart by each ship in the convoy. The
Contessa
was the eighth vessel out and, as the convoy formed, took her place in the third column (north to south) and second row of ships. She was distinguished in the group by the “V” on her stack and a horizontal awning visible behind the stack. To her port side was a British ship, the
Torr Head
. Off her stern was the
Holyhead
, also out of Great Britain. Off her bow was an American ship, the
Santa Isabel
, which flew a flag with the letter “B,” signaling that she was carrying explosives.
    The American experience with the convoy system was new in August, but the learning curve would be quickly climbed in those last months of 1942. One of the earliest realizations was that not only did individual ships not want to be carrying ammunition; they didn’t want to be in the vicinity of ships loaded with explosives. The SS
Mary Luckenbach
, a cargo ship sailing just a month later than the
Contessa
in a convoy on its way to Murmansk (what would become the most dreaded merchant sea route in the war) and carrying a load of TNT, virtually vaporized when she was hit by a torpedo in the North Sea. Not only was she gone in an instant, but reports detailed damage to eleven ships around her caused by the explosion.
    There were other, more immediate, hazards for the ships in the convoy to consider, beyond being blown to smithereens. Perhaps chief among these was collision with the other ships in the convoy. The likelihood of such a crash was enhanced considerably when ships were sailing at night or were ordered to zigzag, change course, or maneuver to avoid torpedoes. For seamen accustomed to plying the oceans on their own, being thrust into packs of dozens of ships could make for adventurous sailing, especially when they were asked to maneuver like a squad of Zor Shriners.Collisions would turn out to be one of the leading causes of damage to and sinking of merchant ships during the war.
    Straggling was also hazardous. Living up to their wolf-pack nickname, German U-boats would mimic the behavior of their lupine models and linger at the heels of convoys, waiting for weak members of the herdto fall behind, unable to keep up with their fellows, at which time the subs would attack, and pity the merchant crew that was left lagging.
    U-boat strategies changed as the American convoy system developed, andthe numbers of German submarines deployed to North Atlantic and Atlantic Seaboard routes by Admiral Doenitz increased through 1942. The Germans used spies and intercepted radio messages to suss out ship movements.