forces would be widely circulated for comment and reaction, as would the drafts of any decision memo I prepared to implement the recommendations of the task force. I wanted the most inclusive process possible, with the widest possible number of intelligence professionals invited to participate.
Of course, sometimes the best of intentions go awry. One of the task forces I established was to examine how the CIA, in particular, could be more open in its relationships with the media and the public. Many good ideas surfaced, including declassifying decades’ worth of analytical papers dealing with the former Soviet Union, providing greater availability of senior agency officials for media interviews, facilitating access to already declassified documents, and easing access to classified files for scholars. Unfortunately, we were subjected to considerable—deserved—criticism and mockery when it was revealed in the press that the task force report on “openness” had been classified “secret.” I immediately declassified it, but the damage was done, thus proving, yet again, that old habits die hard and bureaucracies are often their own worst enemies.
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One strategy new leaders often use in reform initiatives is reorganizing the bureaucracy. But all too often, they confuse organizational and name changes with real change. They believe that moving the boxes around on the organization chart, changing the lines for who reports to whom, making dotted lines into solid lines, and the like will fix problems and represent real change. They are nearly always wrong. When you get a new boss who is bent on changing things by changing the boxes, it usually means he isn’t really serious about change or he doesn’t understand how to lead it.
If a leader wants real change, he must realize the main target is
how
people do their work, not
where.
How you make people more efficient and productive, more effective, more responsive, more open-minded, better at their jobs, is little affected by the placement of their organization on the chart. There is one exception to this general proposition: getting rid of boxes on the chart—reducing layering—is almost always a good thing.
Rearranging the organizational boxes, especially if it involves physical relocations, also is enormously distracting to an organization. Employees will be preoccupied with whether their personal and office status has improved or declined in the reorganization—as well as whether in the game of bureaucratic musical chairs they might find themselves without a job. The large CIA office analyzing Soviet foreign and domestic affairs was moved to a building distant from the agency’s headquarters in the early 1980s; I believe it affected the quality of its work for up to two years. Whether in the public or the private sector, try to leave the boxes, both actual and organizational, alone unless absolutely necessary.
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Finally, how a leader informs her organization and external constituencies about her strategy for reform and how she intends to proceed is an important decision. She needs to decide whether to be low-key and simply announce each initiative or make a big splash.
If you have done the proper preparatory work in terms of consulting with a broad array of your constituencies and shaping the battlefield, my preference is to go with the big splash. A strategy I used again and again wherever I was in charge was to blitz the organization with multiple actions simultaneously, the totality of the measures communicating seriousness of purpose, heft, and the reality of change. For anyone bent on change, one individual gesture or action will often not be persuasive; a dozen or more announced simultaneously are hard to ignore or dismiss. Laying out the full breadth of what you plan to do has dramatic effect, gets people’s attention, and can build enthusiasm and excitement. Announcing initiatives all at once reduces uncertainty about hidden agendas or future