Attack on Pearl Harbor by Alan D. Zimm

the A6M Zeros and get to the bombers.
    One might think that the bombers would be adequately protected by sending the fighters directly against the airfields, especially if surprise was attained. What better way to protect the bombers then by preventing the fighters from ever getting off the ground? But if the enemy fighters were already airborne, the Japanese fighters might miss seeing them and go on to strafe empty bases. With poor radio communications the bombers would not be able to recall the fighters, allowing the defenders the opportunity to attack unescorted bombers
    There simply were too few fighters for the first wave to employ fighter sweep tactics.
    Close Escort
    A second option would be to have the fighters remain with the bombers in a close escort role. In China, Japanese fighter pilots preferred to range freely and dogfight with the enemy, rather than to stick with a bomber formation. Close escort was simply not available in their doctrine or their mindset.
    The Plan
    The decision was to have the fighters accompany groups of bombers en route to the targets. The fighters would engage enemy fighters in the air or, in the absence of aerial opposition, strafe enemy airfields.
    As the first wave flew south, groups would break off and head to their individual objectives.
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25 D3A Vals and six A6M Zeros would break into two groups to hit Wheeler Field from the east and west;
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26 D3A Vals and nine A6M Zeros would attack the Ford Island and Hickam airfields;
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50 B5N Kate high-altitude bombers accompanied by nine A6M Zeros would head for Pearl Harbor;
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40 torpedo-carrying B5N Kate carrier attack planes would drop down to low altitude and split into two groups to approach Pearl Harbor from the west and the east; nine Zero fighters would accompany the torpedo bombers until they were about 10nm from the harbor, where they would split off to attack Ewa Field.
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12 Zeros would attack Kaneohe Field. 35

    The specific orders for the fighters are particularly noteworthy: “The targets of Fighter Combat Units will be enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground.” That wording reflects the Japanese belief in the superiority of the offensive. The order did not say, “Protect the bombers from enemy fighters.” Indeed, it directed the opposite: “In the event that no enemy aircraft are encountered in the air, the (Fighter Combat) units will immediately shift to the strafing of parked aircraft…” 36
    The fundamental Japanese fighter organization was a shotai of three aircraft, with three shotais combining into a chutai of nine aircraft. All the fighter formations assigned to each of the groups were from a single carrier, with the exception of the Kaneohe Field strike group that consisted of a mixture of Shokaku and Zuikaku fighters. This allocation preserved unit integrity, but maintaining unit integrity imposed a nearly even distribution of fighters across the formations that were disproportionate to the value of each formation.
    For example, the torpedo bombers were expected to deliver 27 torpedo hits, enough to sink six battleships. The B5N Kates carrying AP bombs expected eight hits and perhaps to cripple one or two battleships. In other words, the torpedo bombers were three to six times as valuable as the high-altitude bombers. In addition, the torpedo bombers would be the most vulnerable. During their final run to target they would be flying singly, low and slow, in four long strings of bombers with each aircraft separated by hundreds of yards, beyond where their defensive machine guns could provide mutual support. The level bombers would be in five-ship elements with some degree of mutual protection.
    These considerations should have caught the attention of the planners. Fighter cover should have been allocated to the torpedo bombers in proportion to their vulnerability and value. The torpedo bombers should have been wrapped in cotton wool and protected at all costs. Instead, the torpedo bombers, with