Crisis and Command: A History of Executive Power from George Washington to George W. Bush by John Yoo Page B

significant decisions of foreign and domestic policy once the war began. Histories rarely, if ever, mention any role for Congress in the prosecution of the war against Germany and Japan, aside from the provision of money and arms. It was the President, for example, who decided that the United States would allocate its resources to seek victory in Europe first, and Roosevelt alone declared that the Allies would demand unconditional surrender as the only way to end the war.
    FDR, not Congress, made the critical decisions about the shape of the postwar world. He wanted a world policed by four major countries, the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union. He agreed with Great Britain and the Soviet Union to divide Germany -- the "German question" was the fundamental strategic problem at the root of both World Wars. At Yalta, FDR agreed that the Soviet Union would control a sphere of influence extending over Eastern Europe, and in return, those nations would be allowed to hold democratic elections.
    While some believe that Stalin had hoodwinked him, FDR may have recognized the reality of the balance of power in Europe after the war. He may have hoped that his reasonableness in agreeing to Stalin's demands would win, in exchange, Soviet support of the United Nations. Roosevelt also demanded that Britain and France give up their colonies. FDR wanted to forestall a return to both the isolationism and the international disorder of the interwar period. Historians argue today whether Roosevelt truly believed in collective security, or whether he was a realist who accepted the balance of power at the end of World War II. Either way, it was the President who took the initiative to set the policy, although it was one where he could not act alone. Without the Senate's approval, the United Nations would have gone the way of the League of Nations.
    Too often, we focus on mistakes of commission -- a decision to go to war gone bad, or a law that has unintended consequences -- known as Type I errors. FDR showed that the Presidency may be far more effective than the other branches in preventing a failure to take action -- errors of omission, or Type II errors. Left to its own devices, Congress would have blocked aid to the Allies and delayed American entry into World War II by several months, if not years. This may be a result of the internal structure of Congress, which suffers from serious collective action problems. The passage of legislation through both Houses with many members is so difficult that the Constitution can be understood to favor inaction and, therefore, the status quo. The status quo may be best for a nation when it enjoys peace and prosperity, and threats come more often from ill-advised efforts at reform or revolutionary change, but maintaining the status quo may harm the nation when long-term threats are approaching, or unanticipated chances to benefit present themselves during a small window of opportunity.
    In the area of domestic affairs, whether the New Deal or internal security programs, Roosevelt worked with Congress. He had to: the Great Depression's economic nature brought it squarely within the enumerated powers of Congress. Nevertheless, the emergency of the Depression brought home the advantages of presidential leadership in the legislative process. A complex economy beset by a mysterious, but dangerous, ailment required administrative expertise for a cure, and Congress willingly cooperated by transferring massive legislative authority to the agencies.
    FDR ought to be praised for trying every reasonable idea, including this transformation of executive-legislative relations, to reverse the sickening drop in economic activity, but no one knew how to end the Depression. Only now do we know that the New Deal, combined with the Federal Reserve's tight monetary policy and the government's restrictive fiscal policies, made the Great Depression worse. World War II, not the New Deal, ended the persistent