Dennis Wheatley - Duke de Richleau 07 by The Second Seal Page A

one-fifth of their forces to defend their Russian frontier and
concentrate the other four-fifths against France.”
    “If you are
right eighty-eight German divisions will be opposed to eighty-five French. That
is not overwhelming force.”
    “The Germans may
achieve it in the vital sector.”
    “Why?”
    “According to
the Schlieffen plan, less than a third of the German forces are to be disposed
along the Franco-German frontier. The key Belgium fortress of Liege is to be
seized by a coup-de-main immediately the order for mobilization is given.
Immediately the five railways radiating from it are under German control, the
greater part of the German Army is to debouch through Belgium and, in a
scythe-like movement, descend on Paris. Therefore, should the French forces be
more or less evenly distributed, they will find themselves outnumbered by about
three to one at the western end of their line.”
    “Knowing this,
surely the French will take the precaution to guard against such an
eventuality, by concentrating a large part of their army in the neighbourhood
of Amiens?”
     

    The General
hesitated a second, then he said: “You will appreciate that I cannot give you
any definite information about the plans of the French General Staff. On the
other hand, I do not wish to mislead you as to possibilities. Both France and
Germany will require several weeks to complete their mobilization; but, owing
to various factors, there will be a period between the ninth and the thirteenth
day after the order for mobilization has been issued, when the French will have
been able to assemble a greater concentration of forces in the battle area than
the Germans. Certain French Generals have always urged that during this
favourable period France should seize the initiative and launch a full-scale
offensive against Alsace-Lorraine. Should they adopt that strategy, it is clear
that they will not have sufficient forces also to form a great concentration at
the western end of their line. But, of course, if their offensive farther east
proved successful, and they broke right through into Germany, that might compensate
for any temporary success that the Germans met with in north-eastern France.”
    “I’ve always
thought,” put in Sir Bindon, “that the paper Winston Churchill wrote on that
subject at the time of the Agadir crisis summed up the possibilities brilliantly.
He was Home Secretary then, so quite outside all this sort of thing, but he was
invited to the secret meeting convened by the Prime Minister to hear the views
of the Service Chiefs. Later he produced a paper stressing these salient
points;”
    “There would be
two periods at which the French could count on being equal, or possibly
superior, in numbers to the Germans, and so be in a favourable position to
launch an offensive. First, between the ninth and thirteenth day after
mobilization had begun. But, if they did so then, they would be bound to
encounter more and more fresh German formations as they advanced, and so soon
lose the initiative. Therefore, such an offensive was doomed to failure. He
then forecast that, if the Schlieffen plan was adopted, by the twentieth day
after mobilization the Germans would have forced the line of the Meuse, and
that by the fortieth day they would be fully extended. He added that as their
lines of communication through Belgium lengthened they would have to detach
more and more troops to guard them; and that, therefore, by the fortieth day,
if the French had not dissipated their forces in the meantime, a second period
would arise when they would be equal, or possibly superior, to their enemies.
It was then that they should be able to launch their offensive with the best
hope of success.”
    “Brilliant!”
muttered the Duke. “What amazing clarity of mind he possesses. I trust that the
French General Staff were suitably impressed.”
    Sir Henry
laughed. “That is not for me to say. However, it gives you the alternative
strategy to an attack