Fifties by David Halberstam

quickly as possible, before the issue became public. If anything, the need to keep the decision secret signaled that the decision was a fait accompli. Fearing the inevitable, Lilienthal noted in his diary: “We keep saying ‘We have no other course’; what we should say is ‘We are not bright enough to see any other course.’”
    In late November the Joint Chiefs, led by Omar Bradley, an officer Truman greatly admired, weighed in. It would be “intolerable”for us to let the Russians get the weapon first. Nor would American restraint stop them, the Chiefs said. Meanwhile in London, Skardon was beginning to close in on Klaus Fuchs. On December 21, 1949, the two men met for the first time. Skardon asked Fuchs to review his personal history, and over a long session, Fuchs complied. When he was finished, Skardon told Fuchs he was suspected of having passed secret information to the Russians. “I don’t think so,” Fuchs said. They continued to talk at length and Fuchs maintained his innocence, but his belief in his invulnerability was shaken. Skardon continued to press, lightly at first.
    On December 30, Skardon visited Fuchs again and told him that in all likelihood he would lose his position at Harwell because of his father’s move to East Germany. Since Fuchs had no life other than his work, Skardon was making the case that he might as well confess, since his professional life was over, to all intents and purposes. Clearly, he would feel better having unburdened himself, Skardon was suggesting. On January 10, 1950, John Cockcroft, who was the director at Harwell, told Fuchs that it would be better if he resigned. Three days later, on January 13, Fuchs finally admitted that he had passed atomic secrets to the Soviets. At this point Skardon backed off and let Fuchs stew for a time. Nine days later, Fuchs called up Arnold, the Harwell security officer, and said he was willing to talk. They had lunch the next day, and Fuchs spoke of his unhappiness with current Soviet policies in Eastern Europe, which had turned out to be far more brutal than Fuchs had expected. He also said he wanted to see Skardon again. On January 24, Fuchs admitted to Skardon that for eight years he had spied for the Soviet Union. Gradually, in subsequent meetings, it all came out: how many times he had passed information, what the technical nature of it was. On January 27, Fuchs walked with Skardon to the War Office and dictated a long confession. On February 2, he was arrested and charged.
    On January 27, 1950, an atomic expert in the British embassy informed Robert Murphy, the undersecretary of state, of Fuchs’s confession. The members of the GAC learned of it on January 30. On January 31, a National Security subcommittee heard rumors of it. Truman apparently heard of it on February 1.
    Even before the President learned of Fuchs’s arrest, there were signs that the President had made up his mind to go forward with the Super and that Omar Bradley’s recommendation had removed any lingering doubts. Truman had formed a special three-man committee, of Acheson, Lilienthal, and Louis Johnson, secretary of defense,to make a final recommendation. January 31 had been set as the date for their report. Truman asked that their recommendations be unanimous, which was, in a way, a signal to Lilienthal to keep his personal doubts within the confines of the group and not to make a dissent. Lilienthal spoke of his fears of an arms race. Acheson countered by pointing out the growing public and political pressures on Truman. Lilienthal again spoke of his own “grave reservations.” Truman cut him short. He did not, the President said, believe that an H bomb would ever be used, but because of the way the Russians were behaving, he had no other course. The meeting lasted only seven minutes. “Can the Russians do it?” Truman asked. All three men nodded yes. “In that case,” Truman said, “we have no choice. We’ll go ahead.” It was Truman’s first