reinforced by the Röehm putsch: the ânight of the long knivesâ in which the tyranny and bloodletting of the SA was replaced by the tyranny and bloodletting of the SS, all with the silent acquiescence of the army. These macabre events, which saw generals murdered in their homes and countiess others shot out of hand (including two of von Papenâs adjutants, shot across their office desks) only confirmed what Patzig had always suspected: that the new regime was run by gangsters. The fact that among the corpses was his predecessor von Bredow shocked all the staff of the Abwehr. One of them, Major Hans Oster, determined from that day on to work against the regime.
Patzig, meanwhile, was determined to fight a rearguard action while at the same time seeking the calmer waters of an operational appointment. His dealings with Heydrich had become ever more fractious. Heydrich demanded a list of all the armament installations in Germany, which Patzig refused on the grounds that such lists did not exist and would be a risk to national security. This fencing with the SD led to a heated exchange between Blomberg and Patzig, during which the former tried to defend the SS as âan organisation of the Führerâ, evincing the reply from Patzig: âThen I regret that the Führer is not aware of the pigsty he has under him.â Patzig was now isolated and his career at the Abwehrcould not last much longer. Whoever would replace Patzig, Blomberg noted, would have to build a more âconstructive relationshipâ with the SD.
Although there is no evidence to suggest Heydrich may have lobbied behind the scenes for Patzigâs dismissal and replacement by Canaris, it is not inconceivable that Heydrich, through Himmler, may have applied pressure to get rid of one naval officer and have him replaced by another they trusted. 3 There is certainly something guarded, if not mischievously evasive, in Patzigâs post-war evidence that Canaris got the job simply âbecause I could not think of anyone more suitable.â
Canaris may have been the most suitable candidate to replace Patzig but he was not considered by anyone in the navy, with the possible exception of Patzig, as a relevant candidate. But irrespective of any lobbying on his behalf by the SS, Canaris certainly possessed, for those who chose to examine his record, relatively impeccable credentials. He had frequently outwitted British and French intelligence, he was well connected with the magic circle of financiers and industrialists associated with armaments and he even, at the very least, had had a convivial social relationship with that wolf in sheepâs clothing, Heydrich. Thanks to the continuing rumours of his involvement in the Liebknecht affair, Canaris possessed good anti-Bolshevik credentials and was therefore ideologically sound. In addition to this, perhaps critically, he was a naval officer.
In the event, it was this last factor which guaranteed him the job. For as Patzig broke the news to Admiral Raeder that they should consider Canaris as his successor, the Admiral spluttered: âImpossibleâ. Raeder acidly pointed out that he had not sent Canaris to Swinemünde so that he should be considered eligible to play a future role in the German High Command. Quite the reverse; Raeder expected Canaris to retire within the next four years and bring to a discreet close his controversial, but in Raederâs view, relatively undistinguished naval career.
At this point, Patzig may have played the Heydrich card and suggested that Canaris was the only person who could find a modus vivendi withthe SD. He certainly put down his strongest suit. He pointed out that if Raeder was implacably opposed to Canarisâ appointment, it would really be quite simple to find a solution. There would be no alternative but to appoint to the post of Abwehr chief someone from the army. Once again, Patzigâs insight into character weaknesses proved