Real Peace by Richard Nixon Page B

strategic arsenal. In the future, however, we cannot afford to let any of our weapons go unused. The Soviet Union wages the contest across the entire board, militarily, economically, and ideologically. For the West, meeting the Soviets on each of these fronts is both an opportunity and a necessity.
    A U.S. President who goes to the summit with the leader of the Soviet Union should carry with him the chits of the other major industrial powers. When he sits across from his Soviet counterpart it should be as if the leaders of all the nations of the Western alliance were arrayed at his right and left at the negotiating table.
    When President Reagan meets Andropov the consensus statement in support of theater nuclear weapons that emerged from the recent Williamsburg summit guarantees that he will hold a stronger hand than he would have otherwise. Now that the economic picture in the United States and Europe is improving another meeting of the Western leaders might produce the agreement on unified economic policies that has proved so elusive in the past few years. Before meeting with our adversaries it is essential that we meet with our allies. The Western powers and Japan should schedule an additional summit before the Soviet-American summit.
    Such a show of unity has two advantages. It makes it unmistakably clear to the Soviets that the alliance is sound. It also gives the Europeans a chance to help set the agenda.
    The U.S. is far more powerful than it was two decades ago, but relative to the rest of the alliance it has proportionately less power than it once had. That means the alliance as a whole is more powerful than it used to be, but only if it acts as analliance and not a mutual admiration society composed only of fair-weather friends.
    Our alliance should not be like OPEC, a cartel whose fabric is in immediate danger of being rent whenever market conditions make it profitable for one or more members to bolt. The members of the Western alliance must accept that the only kind of action that will have an effect in the struggle with the Soviet Union is unified action—that in matters of East-West relations it is in each nation’s interest to serve the alliance’s interest.
    This applies not only to the Europeans but to the United States as well. Europe’s military contribution is as indispensable as ours; along with Japan its combined economy is greater than ours. Yet on matters affecting the whole alliance American Administrations have too often acted first and consulted with our allies second, and then only as an afterthought. By virtue of our position as the “leader of the Western world” we have sometimes treated the Europeans as poor relations who were expected to follow us meekly down any path we chose to take.
    The Europeans have centuries of experience in leadership. Every one of our political institutions is based on European models or theories. They know the way the world works. The fact that we are the West’s most powerful nation does not mean that we have a monopoly on wisdom. America needs Europe not just because of its economic power and potential military power but because of its brain power. Real peace is too important to settle for anything less than the best thinking the Western world can mobilize to achieve our goal.

C HINA
    Before negotiating with our adversaries we should develop a consensus on key issues with our allies and friends. This is true of Japan and the nations of Western Europe. It is also true of the People’s Republic of China. That is why, apart from other issues, President Reagan’s meeting with Chinese leaders next spring is vitally important.
    Our relationship with China is a key element of our strategy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Many in the United States opposed our China initiative 11 years ago because of their opposition to communism in any form. They contended that since both China and Russia are communist powers, we should treat both as