incoherent. There is simply no other logical space for our beliefs about the world to occupy. As long
as religious propositions purport to be about the way the world is God can actually hear your prayers, If you take his name in vain bad things will happen
to you, etc.they must stand in relation to the world, and to our other beliefs about it. And it is
only by being so situated that propositions of this sort can influence our subse- quent
thinking or behavior. As long as a person maintains that his beliefs represent an actual
state of the world (visible or invisible; spiritual or mundane), he must believe that his
beliefs are a conse- quence of the way the world is. This, by definition, leaves him vul- nerable to new evidence.
Indeed, if there were no conceivable change in the world that could get a person to
question his religious beliefs, this would prove that his beliefs were not predicated upon
his taking any state of the world into account. He could not claim, therefore, to be representing the world at all.26
ALTHOUGH many things can be said in criticism of religious faith, there is no discounting its
power. Millions among us, even now, are quite willing to die for our unjustified beliefs,
and millions more, it seems, are willing to kill for them. Those who are destined to
suffer terribly throughout their lives, or upon the threshold of death, often find
consolation in one unfounded proposition or another. Faith enables many of us to endure
life's difficulties with an equanimity that would be scarcely conceivable in a world lit
only by reason. Faith also appears to have direct physical consequences in cases where
mere expectations, good or bad, can incline the body toward health or untimely death.27 But the fact that religious beliefs have a great influence on human life says nothing at
all about their valid- ity. For the paranoid, pursued by persecutory delusions, terror of the CIA may have great
influence, but this does not mean that his phones are tapped.
What is faith, then? Is it something other than belief? The Hebrew term 'emžn‰ (verb 'mn) is alternately translated as “to have faith,” “to believe,” or “to trust.” The
Septuagint, the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible, retains the same meaning in the
term pisteuein, and this Greek equivalent is adopted in the New Testament. Hebrews 11:1 defines faith as
“the assurance of things hoped for, the convic- tion of things not seen.” Read in the
right way, this passage seems to render faith entirely self-justifying: perhaps the very
fact that one believes in something which has not yet come to pass (“things hoped for”) or
for which one has no evidence (“things not seen”) consti- tutes evidence for its actuality
(“assurance”). Let's see how this works: I feel a certain, rather thrilling “conviction”
that Nicole Kid- man is in love with me. As we have never met, my feeling is my only
evidence of her infatuation. I reason thus: my feelings suggest that Nicole and I must
have a special, even metaphysical, connection otherwise, how could I have this feeling in
the first place? I decide to set up camp outside her house to make the necessary
introductions; clearly, this sort of faith is a tricky business.
Throughout this book, I am criticizing faith in its ordinary, scrip-
tural senseas belief in, and life orientation toward, certain histor- ical and
metaphysical propositions. The meaning of the term, both in the Bible and upon the lips of
the faithful, seems to be entirely unambiguous. It is true that certain theologians and
contemplatives have attempted to recast faith as a spiritual principle that transcends
mere motivated credulity. Paul Tillich, in his Dynamics of Faith (1957), rarefied the original import of the term out of existence, casting away what he
called “idolatrous faith” and, indeed, all equa- tions between faith
Hazel Gower, Jess Buffett
In the Thrill of the Night