The Forgotten Spy by Nick Barratt Page A

focus on what would actually be discussed. The French, led by Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, had drafted an outline proposal which was circulated to the Allies on 29 November. With the help of Foreign Office Librarian Alwyn Parker, Hardinge produced his own complicated blueprint for the conference, with various interlinked geographical committees that placed Foreign Office officials at the heart of the process.
    However, the politicians had other ideas; Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour duly presented Hardinge’s plan to the War Cabinet in October 1918. Prime Minister Lloyd George, long distrustful of the Foreign Office or indeed any institution comprised of ‘experts’, simply laughed at it. Instead he asked War Cabinet member General Jan Smuts to come up with an alternative. The result was even more complicated than Hardinge’s and required the presence of a range of experts from different government departments. Alongside six groups of territorial experts from the Foreign Office, there were specialistsfrom the Board of Trade for advice about the pros and cons of free trade and the global economy; a delegation from the Treasury to advise on financial issues including the economist John Maynard Keynes; representatives from the branches of the armed forces, including the recently formed Royal Air Force, and a plethora of advisors for discussions about the proposed League of Nations and freedom of the seas. Needless to say, many lawyers were invited. In a further snub to Hardinge, Lloyd George asked the Cabinet Secretary, Maurice Hankey, to head the British secretariat, a move which left Hardinge even more bitter and resentful despite Hankey’s best attempts to smooth ruffled feathers. Things had not got off to an auspicious start.
    It was apparent from the outset that large numbers of backroom staff were required to support the British delegation at the conference, whatever shape it took. Office space was required to house the clerks, typists, cipher staff, messengers and payroll officers, plus the official delegates and technical experts – all of whom needed accommodation as well as somewhere to work. Around 400 people were required, as well as a separate printing operation with a further 130 staff to ensure that briefing documents and reports were speedily produced for the various meetings. The budget came from the beleaguered Treasury, already shattered by the war effort. Preparations got underway at once. The administrative and logistical burden largely fell upon the Foreign Office, with the long-suffering Alwyn Parker organising the necessary accommodation in Paris within two days of the Armistice – the Hôtel Majestic for personnel, with higher ranking officials taking either secure flats or suites next door in the Villa Majestic and the Hôtel Astoria was set aside for office space. The Foreign Office was initially allocated to the fourth floor.
    There was also the issue of security – in terms of protecting British intelligence, given that large numbers of nations would be attending, as well as ensuring the safety of the politicians involved, given continuing fears of revolutionary activity articulated by Wilson in the context of Geneva. Such fears were well-founded; Clemenceau was lucky to survive an assassination attempt on 19 February 1919.
    The task of intelligence protection was the responsibility of Sir Henry Penson’s intelligence clearing house, also allocated an entire floor, while theAssistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and Head of the Criminal Investigation Department, Basil Thomson, was assigned the latter task. He took his work very seriously, down to the level of ensuring that the rooms at the hotels were cleaned by British hands brought over especially for the purpose, rather than leave it to chance that a ‘native’ cleaner might try to secure secrets from the delegates’ rooms. His preferred plan was to bring in demobilised Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps staff, not simply