The Politics of Climate Change by Anthony Giddens

back-of-the-mind one. Foregrounding refers to the use of the various political devices that can be deployed to keep global warming at the core of the political agenda.
5   Climate change positives . It won’t be possible to mobilize effectively against global warming simply on the basis of the avoidance of future dangers – that is, in a wholly negative way. We will need some more positive goals to aim for. I believe these can come mainly from areasof political and economic convergence. Climate change policy involves thinking in the long term, and it involves an emphasis on the ‘durable’ rather than the ephemeral. I shall try to show that these concerns overlap significantly with well-being, rather than with sheer economic growth.
6   Political transcendence . Responding to climate change must not be seen as a left–right issue. Climate change has to be a question that largely transcends party politics, and about which there is an overall framework of agreement that will endure across changes of government. I have never agreed with the idea that the political centre – where the parties converge – is the antithesis of radicalism. Sometimes overall political agreement is the condition of radical policy-making, and coping with climate change certainly falls into that category.
7   The percentage principle . This concept marks the recognition that no course of action (or inaction) is without risks; and that, consequently, there is always a balance of risks and opportunities to be considered in any policy context.
8   The development imperative . Poorer countries must have the right to develop economically, even if this process involves a significant growth in greenhouse gas emissions.
9   Over-development . In the rich countries, affluence itself produces a range of quite profound social problems. Economic growth correlates with measures of welfare only up to a certain level; after that point, the connection becomes more problematic. Addressing problems of over-development forms a major area of political convergence with policies relevant to controlling climate change.
10   Proactive adaptation . Given that climate change will happen whatever we do from now onwards, a politics of adaptation will have to be worked out alongside that of climate change mitigation. We must as far as possible prepare beforehand in a pre-emptive fashion, basing what we do upon risk assessment, with policies evolving as scientific information shifts and matures.
    In the next chapter, deploying some of these concepts, I shall consider where the developed countries have got to intheir attempts to begin a switch to a low-carbon economy. I shall look to some extent across the board, but take the UK as a key example, since its experience is in some ways typical of the problems that all will have to face.

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    Some environmentalists argue that liberal democratic societies are not equipped to cope with ecological problems, especially climate change, given the far-reaching character of the social and economic reforms that will be needed. Is it really possible to formulate policies for the long term in such societies, given the concentration of most citizens on the immediate issues of their lives? 1 In The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy , David Shearman and Joseph Wayne Smith argue that the answer is ‘no’. Democratic states, they say, are too dominated by sectional interests and by a hapless materialism to be able to create policies substantial enough to meet the scale of the challenge we face. We should accept that confronting our environmental dilemmas will require a more authoritarian approach from government: ‘For us, freedom is not the most fundamental value and is merely one value among others. Survival strikes us as a much more basic value.’ 2
    The difficulties facing liberal democratic states as they confront climate