Vichy France by Robert O. Paxton Page A

Benoist-Méchin and Yves Bouthillier.Pétain was also interrograted in his prison on the Ile d’Yeu in January 1947, revealing that the old man was by now genuinely senile (see the report in Le Monde , 19 January 1947).
    The full sequence of Franco-German government relations (best followed in Ernst von Weizsäcker’s “Frankreich” file, vol. 6, T-120/405) for this period puts the whole affair into perspective. It is true that Hitler began to reopen the French question in December 1941–January 1942, with Rommel being pressed toward the frontiers of Tunisia, as he always did when he needed something from France. It is also true that Darlan and Pétain, as always, were no less eager than in the fall of 1941 for a sweeping Franco-German settlement. The entry of the United States into the war on 7 December 1941 introduced the new issue of whether France would break relations or not, but the January 1942 negotiation should be seen as the last gasp of the Protocols of Paris maneuvers rather than merely as a response to the American entry into the war. The final essential point is that the January 1942 negotiation was the work of subordinates, Abetz and Benoist-Méchin, who were disavowed by superiors on both sides.
    Otto Abetz found his fortunes at a low ebb following the final failure of the postprotocol negotiations at the end of 1941 and the misunderstanding of the Pétain-Goering meeting on December 1 at Saint-Florentin. Back in Germany for consultations, he had a rare meeting with Hitler on January 5, 1942. This heady experience seems to have prompted him to mount a major diplomatic scheme of his own. Hitler, who wanted the use of Bizerte for aid to Rommel, seems to have mused about the possibilities of meeting Darlan and of negotiating a peace settlement with France in the event of a French entry into war against the Allies. For the moment, however, even a French rupture of diplomatic relations was put off for further consideration. (See Abetz’ report to Ribbentrop of this meeting, T-120/405/214238–39, and Mémorandum d’Abetz , 128–39.) Hitler may have been tempted by the idea of shifting occupation forces from France to the Russian front.
    Back in Paris on January 9, Abetz sought out Jacques Benoist-Méchin, the prewar propagandist for a French understanding with Hitler who was now Secretaire-général à la vice-présidence du conseil and Darlan’s roving negotiator with the Germans. Hitler’s rather hypothetical musings now blossomed into a firm four-point offer. If France was ready to “march with us to the end of the conflict,” there could be a “profound modification” of the current Franco-German status, preliminary accord over a peace treaty, study of material and economic means France would need to meet her new responsibilitiesand of the best way to present the matter to French public opinion. If the French were agreed in principle (and Hitler did not want an immediate French declaration of war), Hitler, Abetz said, was “ready to grant a Treaty of Peace which will astonish the French.” Benoist-Méchin reported this proposal, perhaps further inflated, in his letter of 9 January to Darlan [see text in Procès Benoist-Méchin (Paris, 1948), 340–46]. He asked for a reply by the following Monday.
    There is no reason to doubt that these issues were indeed discussed at Vichy. A sweeping settlement was just what Darlan had been working for since February 1941. General Juin had just been in Berlin working out what would happen if Rommel had to withdraw into Tunisia, thus bringing the North African desert war onto French soil. Pétain had just seen Goering, with a fat dossier of concessions the French wanted in exchange for their cooperation in such matters. The reply that Benoist-Méchin brought back on 12 January (see text in Procès Benoist-Méchin , 347–49) was affirmative in general principles but surrounded by all sorts of qualifications. Benoist-Méchin pointed out to Abetz that in no case