Vichy France by Robert O. Paxton Page B

could France be drawn into operations that would require total or partial mobilization. Vichy was apprehensive about too quick action. A solution must move by stages, with clear material and psychological preparation in advance. Benoist-Méchin talked mostly about African operations, to which he said Vichy was already committed by Pétain’s agreement about Rommel. In other words, the same Vichy plea for caution and for concessions that would strike public opinion in the eye, coupled with an interest in an overall settlement. There was no mention of immediate French war on the Allies.
    The French were interested in what they were told was Hitler’s new mood; Abetz now had to get Ribbentrop interested. In his telegram of 13 January (T-120/405/214258–60), Abetz reported having given Benoist-Méchin “his own” opinion of overall Franco-German relations—i.e., he recognized his own initiative in what had been presented to the French as an offer from Hitler. Then he said that France was “ripe for a discussion of fundamental questions.” Unlike the case in 1941, he said, the French were ready for negotiations without political preconditions. Abetz said he had never mentioned a preliminary peace to the French. But the French had “unanimously” decided to declare war on Britain and the United States in return for “satisfactory status” after the war.
    Abetz had consistently misrepresented the terms of his conversation, first to the French, then to his own superiors. Neither governmentwent any further with it. Hitler’s thoughts about some possible French solution to both his North African and Russian front problems, if they were anything more than figments of Abetz’ imagination, were fleeting. Rommel had begun to advance again in early January. Darlan, on his side, made it clear to Schleier on 29 January that he could see no German interest in a French declaration of war upon the Allies. France, he said, would declare war on the Allies only if the Allies invaded the empire. See Schleier (Paris) 423 to Abetz (Berlin) 30 January 1942 (T-120/405/214294–95). Hitler still rejected cooperation with France that would purchase a soft peace. See the Goebbels Diaries, 7 March 1942.
    Benoist-Méchin was left high and dry. He kept asking Abetz what had happened to the “constructive” French answer, which he understood had been relayed to the German military high command (Benoist-Méchin note to Abetz, 25 March 1942, Procès , 351). Abetz’ influence continued to diminish with Ribbentrop, who finally told him on 25 November 1942 to “cease all activity in the domain of political developments and Franco-German relations, and take no personal initiatives.” (Ribbentrop 1475 of 25 November 1942, T-120/928/297469–71; also text of telephone message in Ministère public c/Bouthillier , fascicule 4, 116).

Appendix B
Glossary of French and German Abbreviations
     
     
     
     
     
CDJC
Centre de documentation juive contemporaine, Paris
CFLN
Comité français de liberation nationale
CFTC
Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens
CGT
Confédération générale du travail
CGTU
Confédération générale du travail unitaire
CO
Comité d’organisation
DFCAA
Délégation française auprès de la commission allemande d’armistice
DGFP
Documents on German Foreign Policy
ENA
Ecole nationale d’administration
FRUS
Foreign Relations of the United States
LFC
Légion française des combattants
OKH
Oberkommando des Heeres
OKW
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
SFIO
Section française de l’internationale ouvrière
SD
Sicherheitsdienst
SNI
Syndicat national des instituteurs
STO
Service du travail obligatoire
UNC
Union nationale des combattants
UFC
Union fédérale des combattants

Bibliographical Note
     
     
    I shall not make a tedious list of all the materials used in the preparation of this book. Readers interested in the specialized bibliography of particular questions should consult the footnotes at appropriate passages. Even