Missing in Action by Ralph Riegel

was an avid reader and secured old newspapers and books from his Belgian superior officers. By continuing his studies in this way, he was able to secure work as a journalist when he left the army. It is interesting to note that Mobutu’s favourite books were those by Charles de Gaulle, Winston Churchill and Niccolo Machiavelli – men who had grasped the true meaning of political power and knew precisely how to properly wield it. What very few people knew was that Mobutu had also worked as a police informer, reporting to Belgian colonial officials on the activities of some of his Congolese nationalist colleagues.
    Ironically, the decision to promote Mobutu was made by Lu-mumba. It was an action that ultimately destroyed him. The prime minister was badly shaken by unrest within the Force Publique and determined to rid himself of all its Belgian officers. Congolese soldiers who had never risen above the rank of sergeant now suddenly found themselves promoted to that of major and colonel. Lumumba’s cousin, Victor Lundula, was plucked from obscurity to become a major-general while Lumumba, impressed by Mobutu, appointed him chief of staff, holding the rank of colonel. It was an incredibly short-sighted and, ultimately, disastrous move for Lumumba. With one stroke, he had placed the single most important source of power in the Congo outside his own direct personal control.
    Should Mobutu prove a loyal ally, all would be well. But should Mobutu prove ambitious or ruthless, he had just been handed the keys to the state. The changes resulted in chaos and the Force Publique, more than anything else, contributed to the carnage that spread throughout the new republic. Mobutu wasted no time and, as chief of staff, ensured that the new Congolese officer class was loyal to him and not Lumumba or the fledgling government.
    Within months, Mobutu had used the military to undermine Lumumba, isolate the prime minister’s remaining allies and strip him of all real power. Lumumba was now effectively defenceless in the face of his enemies. Mobutu – unheard of before 1959/60 – was now Congo’s ‘Cher Colonel’ (Dear Colonel) and beloved of the troops whose futures he now promised to massively enrich.
    Lumumba was also held personally responsible for the horrific orgy of violence that unleashed itself across the Congo. White farmers in isolated rural areas were the first targets of the Congolese who were determined to take revenge for decades of colonial abuses. Reports of murders and rapes flooded into Leopoldville, Elisabethville and ultimately Brussels. Belgian politicians later determined that 291 European women – mostly Belgians – had been raped by Force Publique troops who were now rampaging throughout parts of the country. Thousands of Belgian estate owners abandoned their holdings and fled for their lives to Congo-Brazzaville, northern Rhodesia, Uganda and Angola. In Brussels, responsibility for the carnage was laid at the Congo prime minister’s
door.
    Lumumba had been weakened from within by rivalries carefully nurtured by the US with emerging Congolese officials including Joseph Kasavubu, Mobutu and others. These rivalries would be crucial in leaving Lumumba vulnerable and isolated when his enemies chose to strike. Belgian interests also fostered a growing separatist movement in Katanga to the south, where a pro-Brussels administration was deemed preferable to the ‘radicals’ who were taking the helm in Leopoldville.
    Central to the Belgian and European ambitions in this regard was Moise Tshombe, the leader of the Conakat movement and a former sergeant in the Belgian-run Congolese army. To the Europeans, Tshombe represented stability and a pro-business administration that was compliant to European concerns. Tshombe made it clear he was willing to be a loyal Belgian ally, which secured him all the backing he needed to make Katanga independent. Tshombe also enjoyed the full confidence of Union Minière and other major