Neptune: The Allied Invasion of Europe and the D-Day Landings by Craig L. Symonds

Tunisia before the Germans brought in reinforcements. At first he hoped to do this within a matter of days. After two weeks, he was hoping “to complete the occupation … by mid December.” By the end of the year, he was looking for success “early in March.” With almost comical understatement, the official historian of the campaign wrote in 1957: “Succeeding operations in the Mediterranean area proved more extensive than intended.” 35
    The “rush eastward” was derailed by several factors. One was the need to consolidate the ports to ensure the continued movement of supplies; another was the need to build new airfields and repair existing ones in order to provide air cover for the advance; a third was that American forces and their equipment had to be moved from Morocco to Algeria, a movement exacerbated by the perpetual shipping problem. Ike noted that “from the day we started,” the problem of inadequate shipping restricted his movements. Now, once again, “the old shipping problem rises up to smite us.” Instead of sending the 250 Sherman tanks that had landed at Safi to Algeria by sea, they were hauled more than eight hundred miles overland on North Africa’s rickety and unreliable single-track railroad. Nor did the weather cooperate. The postponement of the assault from October to November meant that the ensuing ground campaign took place during the rainy season, when swift movement—or any movement—was inhibited by muddy roads. 36
    Then, too, Eisenhower was sidetracked and frustrated by interminable negotiations with various French leaders. Concluding that the Americans had come to stay, the French agreed to join the anti-Axis alliance. But there was a bitter debate among several self-appointed candidates about who should emerge as the leader of the French contingent in that alliance. The Allies had counted on General Henri Giraud to rally the French to their side, but Giraud declared that he would play no role at all unless he was given supreme command of all Allied forces. As always, Eisenhower remained outwardly calm, though inside he was seething, and he unburdened himself to Marshall. “I find myself getting absolutely furious with these stupid Frogs,” he wrote, bemoaning “the necessity of dealing with little, selfish, conceited worms that call themselves men.” Eventually, Eisenhower made a deal with Admiral Jean-François Darlan granting the Frenchman authority over all ofNorth Africa in exchange for his cooperation. Eisenhower may have thought that one “Frog” was as good (or as bad) as another, but Darlan had been a prominent Nazi collaborator, and the British and American public response to the arrangement was outrage. Ike survived the criticism, and the awkwardness of working with a former collaborator ended when Darlan was assassinated by a French monarchist on Christmas Eve. 37
    Most of all, however, the Allied advance into Tunisia was slowed by the Germans, who rushed reinforcements into North Africa and established strong defensive positions before the British and Americans could exploit the surprise of their initial landings. As a result, what was supposed to be a quick dash turned into a lengthy slog. The low point was a surprise German counterattack at Kasserine Pass in February 1943. Directed by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, who justified his reputation as “the Desert Fox” in this campaign, two German Panzer divisions smashed through American defenses and advanced for three days before withdrawing. The Americans lost some twenty-five hundred men and more than a hundred tanks. This debacle was a wake-up call for American arms, and for Eisenhower as well. It forced Ike to reassess his assumptions about the timetable, and to make several changes in command, including urging the promotion of George Patton. Some British soldiers, who had been fighting in North Africa since June 1940, saw Kasserine Pass as a kind of comeuppance for the brash Americans. A few punned on the