The Everlasting Empire by Yuri Pines

Xiaowen (r. 471–499) of the Northern Wei (386–534). Eventually, unification was attained only when the late sixth-century Sino-nomadic leaders of northwestern China, who combined the military skills of the nomads with the Chinese determination to achieve unity, finally allocated sufficient resources to subdue the South and put an end to centuries of division. 68
    The nomadic challenge to the notion of unity recurred in the tenth century, in the aftermath of the Tang dynasty’s demise. The northeastern Khitan tribesmen formed the new Liao dynasty (907–1125), which swiftly established its hegemony over the eastern section of the steppe belt, and over sixteen northeastern prefectures of China proper. Unlike
    -38-

other nomadic states, the Liao from its inception acted as a proper “Chinese” dynasty: its rulers adopted the Chinese imperial title and claimed to be true heirs of the great Tang dynasty. As such they were expected to try to unify all of China under their aegis; and their active involvement in the affairs of northern China in the post-Tang era could have suggested precisely this course of affairs. In 947, Liao briefly occupied Kaifeng, the capital at the time of northern China, and for a short while—before their rapid withdrawal—it seemed that China faced a new period of nomadic rule in the north, and potentially in the whole of the country. 69
    These expectations notwithstanding, Liao rulers resisted the temptation to enter the nightmarish politics of divided China. They continued to maintain a dual identity, combining nomadic and Chinese traditions in their administration, and appeared to be satisfied to rule over just the sixteen prefectures of China proper. Liao remained the most powerful state in East Asia even after the Song dynasty reunified most of China in 960; and its military prowess enabled it to negotiate an exceptionally favorable treaty with the Song in 1005. According to the Treaty of Shanyuan, the Song emperor recognized his Liao counterpart as his equal; Liao retained the sixteen prefectures and received huge annual payments from the Song court. The treaty proved remarkably viable: aside from brief conflicts in 1042 and 1074–1076, both sides maintained peace, even if, at times, grudgingly. 70
    In terms of realpolitik, the Shanyuan Treaty was a good bargain for the Song: even annual payments to Liao were minuscule in comparison with the costs of war, and lasting peace allowed Song rulers to create a remarkably stable and efficient state. And yet the treaty undermined the very foundations of dynastic legitimacy. Recognizing the equal status of the Liao emperor was bad enough; but it could be tolerated if the Khitans remained pure aliens, like the Turks, Uighurs, or Tibetans, whose independent and equal status had been recognized by China’s rulers in the past. Yet Liao presented itself as a Chinese dynasty; it demanded equality in terms of Chinese diplomatic protocol; and it ruled Chineseinhabited territories to the south of the Great Wall. Its persistence meant that the Song emperors failed to complete the unification of the realm, and this challenged their position as “True Monarchs.” To aggravate the matter, the normalization of two concurrent emperors encouraged new players, most notably the Tangut Xi Xia kingdom (1038–1227), to attempt to create yet more loci of recognized authority on a par with the Song and the Liao. The notion of the singularity of the Chinese Son of Heaven had been greatly compromised. 71
    Members of the Song political and intellectual elite faced a difficult task in trying to come to terms with the new situation. While the practical advantages of the Shanyuan Treaty and the lasting peace on the vulnera
    -39-

ble northern frontier were self-evident, and while the exceptionality of the Liao in comparison with earlier nomadic polities was readily recognized, the idea of lasting parity with the Liao was nonetheless considered abnormal. In the short term,