The Hidden People of North Korea by Ralph Hassig, Kongdan Oh Page A

contest it. The North Korean political system lacks checks and balances because the legislature and courts must answer to the party, and the party is, first and last, a tool of Kim’s leadership. Even in the era of military-first politics, the top generals seem to have no political agenda and, in any case, live and work under close party surveillance.
    Because Kim governs by personal power rather than organizational position, the best way to assess how much political power officials exercise is to look at their personal relationships to Kim. Those closest to him may never appear in public, but they are probably the most powerful people in the regime because they have Kim’s ear and, more importantly, his trust. High-ranking officials who appear at meetings with foreigners are often only front men. A good example is the chairman (also called “president”) of the presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly. Even though he is the highest official in the government, he probably has less political clout than some party officials. In any case, the SPA is nothing more than a part-time legislature that convenes for a few days each year to ratify the party’s decisions. Likewise, Kim surrounds himself with high-ranking generals who follow him around on inspection tours, thereby demonstrating to the army and to the public that Kim is the man in charge.
    Real power resides in what could be called Kim’s inner cabinet. The makeup of this informal cabinet, whose members presumably never convene as a group but instead work with Kim at his office or socialize with him at his parties, has always been the subject of much speculation among foreign analysts. Most of the people who seem to belong to this inner circle are of Kim’s generation or younger; all are presumably loyal to him and believe that their interests coincide with his. Some hold positions of power in the military, others in the party, and others in the government. Many hold multiple positions. Some in the inner circle are members of Kim’s own family, such as his sister and his brother-in-law.
    Kim’s personal secretariat, which screens incoming reports and communicates Kim’s instructions, has offices next to his. An Yong-chol, a former officer in the KPA, has written about the secretariat and described the physical layout of Kim’s office, which is in the three-story headquarters of the KWP’s Organization and Guidance Department, the most powerful of the party organizations. 52 Formerly housing Kim Il-sung’s office, the building is in a special party compound in downtown Pyongyang, surrounded by tall trees and an eleven-meter-high wall. It is believed that Kim can commute to his office by way of an underground tunnel from one of his Pyongyang houses.
    To keep Kim better informed than anyone else, information channels are vertical, not horizontal. Over the years, Kim has developed an extensive reporting system that keeps him apprised of what is happening in all sectors of society, while people in those sectors do not have accurate information about what is happening outside their domains. Officials are expected to transmit information to Kim in a timely fashion, and if he receives that information from another source first, heads may roll. The regime’s principal security organizations—the Ministry of People’s Security (MPS), State Security Department (SSD), and Security Command—have separate communication channels with Kim and often compete among themselves to provide him with information. 53 Kim’s spies are everywhere, and people in critical lines of communication, and therefore with the most power, are the most carefully watched. The top elites, such as cabinet ministers, party secretaries, and KPA generals, must account for their comings and goings.
    Defectors say that reports sent to Kim are often doctored to make conditions look favorable to the departmental bureaucrats, a phenomenon that characterizes most bureaucracies. Kim is nobody’s fool,