The Hidden People of North Korea by Ralph Hassig, Kongdan Oh

filled with the usual propaganda. Exactly where the lecture was given and who was in the audience is not known, but it sounds very much like Kim. At the time, North Korea was in the depths of the 1995– 1998 famine, most factories had stopped operating, and people were moving from town to town looking for food.
    Kim shows an acute awareness of the country’s hardships but offers no practical solutions. He complains that most party officials, including those in the Central Committee, are not working hard. He claims he began assisting Kim Il-sung in the 1960s but that today party officials can give him no assistance because of their incompetence. Kim overlooks the obvious fact that he has been the party leader for the last twenty or thirty years, and if anyone were able to instill spirit and vigor, it should be him.
    Then he launches into a defense of his leadership: “At this time when the situation is complicated, I cannot solve all knotty problems, handling practical economic work. … When he was alive, the leader told me not to get involved in economic work. He repeatedly told me that if I got involved in economic work, I would not be able to handle party and army work properly. … Administrative and economic functionaries must take charge of economic work in a responsible manner.”
    Kim’s solution to the food problem, for that matter, to all problems, is for the officials to get out of their offices and work with the people, somehow meeting the country’s challenges simply by being on the front lines. He ignores the fact that his years of on-the-spot guidance have not revived the economy.
    He demonstrates an amazing faith in the power of propaganda and agitation, recommending that party officials go to the employees and “ask them to produce and to ship more fertilizer, farming goods, and people’s commodities.” With people literally dying in the streets from starvation, he says, “If we tell our people they should eat only 450 grams a day [a starvation diet] and donate the remainder as rice for the army, all of them will willingly comply.”
    With excellent foresight, Kim warns that if people become responsible for finding their own food, black market activity will increase and erode support for the party. As it happened, five years later Kim put an end to the ration system and told people to earn their own livings, with exactly the consequences he had predicted.
    Kim Jong-il’s Governing Style
    Decision Making
    We only partially understand how decisions are made at the highest levels of the North Korean government because no close aide to Kim Jong-il is known to have defected. Throughout most of his career, it appears, Kim did not consult with advisors as often as his father did; however, since suffering a stroke in 2008, he has very likely begun relying heavily on other top officials to help him make decisions. 51 He intervenes in even the smallest affairs if they come to his attention and engage his interest. On important matters, Kim turns to his subordinates for policy suggestions, telephoning them at any hour of the day or night and encouraging them to discuss and argue among themselves. These subordinates forward their recommendations to Kim, who evaluates them in terms of what is good for national security and what is good for himself.
    Kim works late into the night, a practice he says he picked up during the years when he was preparing reports to put on his father’s desk first thing in the morning. Kim Jong-il’s adopted niece, Nam-ok, says he often brought work home, and one of his associates says Kim would sometimes sneak out of late-night parties he was hosting in order to work in his office. It is not known whether Kim engages in a true exchange of ideas or simply solicits opinions and then makes unilateral decisions. Kim’s imperious behavior in public suggests that he uses the latter decision-making process. There is little doubt that once Kim has made a decision, no one can question or